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1. INTRODUCTION 
The erosion of trust put in traditional database servers and in 
Database Service Providers (DSP), the growing interest for different 
forms of data dissemination and the concern for protecting children 
from suspicious Internet content are different factors that lead to 
move the access control from servers to clients. Due to the intrinsic 
untrustworthiness of client devices, client-based access control 
solutions rely on data encryption. The data are kept encrypted at the 
server and a client is granted access to subparts of them according to 
the decryption keys in its possession. Several variations of this basic 
model have been proposed (e.g., [1, 6]) but they have in common to 
minimize the trust required on the client at the cost of a static way of 
sharing data. Indeed, whatever the granularity of sharing, the dataset 
is split in subsets reflecting a current sharing situation, each 
encrypted with a different key. Once the dataset is encrypted, 
changes in the access control rules definition may impact the subset 
boundaries, hence incurring a partial re-encryption of the dataset 
and a potential redistribution of keys.  
Unfortunately, there are many situations where access control 
rules are user specific, dynamic and then difficult to predict. Let 
us consider a community of users (family, friends, research team) 
sharing data via a DSP or in a peer-to-peer fashion, it is likely that 
the sharing policies change as the initial situation evolves 
(relationship between users, new partners, new projects with 
diverging interest, etc.). Again, while the exchange of medical 
information is traditionally ruled by predefined sharing policies, 
these rules may suffer exceptions in particular situations (e.g., in 
case of emergency) [5] and may evolve over time (e.g., depending 
on the patient’s treatment). Regarding parental control, neither 
Web site nor Internet Service Provider can predict the diversity of 
access control rules that parents with different sensibility are 
willing to enforce.  
In the meantime, software and hardware architectures are rapidly 
evolving to integrate elements of trust in client devices. Secure 
tokens and smart cards plugged or embedded into different 
devices are exploited in a growing variety of applications (e.g., 
authentication, healthcare, digital right management). Thus, 
Secure Operating Environments (SOE) becomes a reality on client 
devices [10]. Hardware SOE guarantee a high tamper-resistance, 
generally on limited resources (tiny secured working and stable 
memories).  
In [2], we exploited these new elements of trust in order to devise 
smarter client-based access control managers. The goal pursued is 
being able to evaluate dynamic and personalized access control 
rules on a ciphered input document, with the benefit of 
dissociating access rights from encryption. The considered input 
documents are XML documents, the de-facto standard for data 
exchange. We proposed a streaming evaluator of access control 
rules based on non-deterministic automata and designed a 
streaming index structure allowing skipping the irrelevant parts of 
the input document. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
approach, we made experiments considering a smart card as the 
target SOE. Given the current smart card hardware limitations, we 
relied on a prototype written in C and running on a cycle accurate 
smart card hardware simulator. 
The objective of this demonstration is threefold: 
1. To validate the solution proposed in [2] on a real smart card 
platform, including the non-deterministic automata engine and 
the skip index structure. 
2. To show how our smart card engine can be integrated in a 
distributed architecture including the smart card, the server 
and the user terminal. Indeed, the tamper resistance of the 
access control relies not only on the SOE but also on the 
whole environment (e.g., communication protocol, access 
rights update protocol, etc.). These important issues have not 
been deeply discussed in [2], where the focus was put on the 
components running inside the SOE. 
3. To illustrate the generality of the approach and the easiness of 
deployment of the proposed infrastructure through two very 
different applications. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls from [2] the 
foundation of our proposal required to weight up the value of the 
demonstration. Section 3 presents the demonstration platform and 
the way we plan to validate our techniques. 
2. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
To illustrate the approach, let us consider different users willing 
to exchange safely sensitive information (i.e., XML documents in 
our context) located in an untrusted data store (e.g., a DSP).   
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Figure 1. Target architecture 
Basically, when a user issues a query to the data store, the SOE 
fetches the appropriate encrypted XML document from the server, 
decrypts it, checks that it has not been tampered, enforces the 
access control on it and delivers the authorized subpart matching 
the query. While this example illustrates a pull-based scenario, 
our approach can support push-based scenarios (e.g., selective 
data dissemination) in a very similar way. In the following, we 
first depict the abstract architecture; then we present the access 
control model and finally describe the proposed streaming access 
control mechanism. 
2.1 Target architecture 
 
Figure 1 pictures an abstract representation of the target 
architecture for the applications mentioned in the introduction. 
The access control being evaluated on the client, the client device 
has to be made tamper resistant thanks to a Secure Operating 
Environment (SOE) (e.g., a smart card). We make the following 
traditional assumptions on the SOE: 1) the code executed by the 
SOE cannot be corrupted, 2) the SOE has at least a small quantity 
of secure stable storage (to store secrets like encryption keys), 3) 
the SOE has at least a small quantity of secure working memory 
(to protect sensitive data structures at processing time).  
In our context, the SOE is in charge of decrypting the input 
document, checking its integrity and evaluating the access control 
policy corresponding to a given (document, subject) pair.  Under 
the assumption that the SOE is secure, the only way to mislead 
the access control rule evaluator is to tamper the input document, 
for example by substituting or modifying encrypted blocks, thus 
motivating the encryption and integrity checking. 
Access control policies as well as the key(s) required to decrypt 
the document can be either permanently hosted by the SOE, 
refreshed or downloaded via a secure channel from different 
sources (trusted server, license provider, server managing parent’s 
consent, etc). 
2.2 Access Control Model 
Several authorization models have been recently proposed for 
regulating access to XML documents. We introduce below a 
simplified access control model for XML, inspired by Bertino’s 
model [1] and Samarati’s model [3] that roughly share the same 
foundation. Subtleties of these models are ignored for the sake of 
simplicity.  In this simplified model, access control rules, or access 
rules for short, take the form of a 3-uple <sign, subject, object>. 
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Figure 2. Access control rule automaton 
Sign denotes either a permission (positive rule) or a prohibition 
(negative rule) for the read operation. Subject is self-explanatory. 
Object corresponds to elements or subtrees in the XML document, 
identified by an XPath expression. We consider here a rather robust 
subset of XPath denoted by XP{[],*,//} [7]. This subset, widely used in 
practice, consists of node tests, the child axis (/), the descendant axis 
(//), wildcards (*) and predicates or branches […]. The cascading 
propagation of rules is implicit in the model, meaning that a rule 
propagates from an object to all its descendants in the XML 
hierarchy. Due to this propagation mechanism and to the 
multiplicity of rules for a same user, a conflict resolution principle 
is required. Conflicts are resolved using two policies: 1) Denial-
Takes-Precedence, which states that if two rules of opposite signs 
apply on the same object, then the negative one prevails and 2) 
Most-Specific-Object-Takes-Precedence, which states that a rule 
which applies directly to an object takes precedence over a 
propagated rule.  
2.3 Efficient streaming access control  
The streaming requirement is twofold. First, the evaluator must 
adapt to the memory constraint of the SOE, thereby precluding 
materialization (e.g., building a DOM representation of the 
document). Second, some target applications mentioned in the 
introduction are likely to consume streaming documents (e.g., 
selective data dissemination). Efficiency is, as usual, an important 
concern, and leads to rely on indexing to quickly converge 
towards the authorized parts of the input document, while 
skipping the others. Indexing is of utmost importance considering 
the two limiting factors of the target architecture: the cost of 
decryption in the SOE and the cost of communication between the 
SOE, the client and the server.  
Access rules evaluation 
At first glance, streaming access control resembles the well-
known problem of XPath processing on streaming documents [8], 
which has been widely studied notably in the context of XML 
filtering [4]. While access rules are expressed in XPath, the nature 
of our problem differs significantly from the preceding ones 
because rules are not independent, bringing two new issues: 1) at 
parsing time the evaluator must be capable of determining the set 
of rules targeting a given node and deciding which one apply 
according to the conflict resolution policies and 2) some rules 
may be inhibited by others according to the conflict resolution 
policies, thereby optimizations such as suspending evaluations of 
rules can be devised. 
As streaming documents are considered, we make the assumption 
that the evaluator is fed by an event-based parser (e.g., SAX) 
raising open, value and close events respectively for each 
opening, text and closing tag in the input document. Each access 
rule is represented by a non-deterministic automaton, as pictured 
in Figure 2. This automaton is made up of a navigational path (in 
white in the figure) representing the XPath without its predicate 
and predicate paths (in gray in the figure) appended to it. 
Basically, when an open or a value event is received, all the 
automata are checked and go to their next state. Upon receiving a 
close event, all the automata backtrack. To manage these 
automata efficiently, we use a stack that keeps track of active 
states, materializing all the possible paths that can be followed on 
the non-deterministic automata. In order for a rule to apply, all its 
final states must be reached. This is controlled using a predicate 
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set which records all the final states of predicates that have been 
reached. In some cases, the final state of a navigational path may 
be reached while those of its predicate paths are not. In these 
cases, the rule is said to be pending, meaning that the nodes upon 
which it applies are to be delivered only if, later on in the parsing, 
all the predicate paths are found to reach their final states. Finally, 
propagation of rules as well as conflicts are managed with a sign 
stack which keeps on the top, the current sign that is propagated if 
no other rule applies. More details can be found in [2]. 
Skip index 
To reduce the flow of data received by the SOE and thus the 
decryption time, we devise a new indexation structure that 
enables to skip irrelevant (i.e., forbidden) parts of the documents. 
The first distinguishing feature of the required index is the 
necessity to keep it encrypted outside of the SOE to guarantee the 
absence of information disclosure. The second distinguishing 
feature (related to the first one and to the SOE storage capacity) is 
that the SOE must manage the index in a streaming fashion, 
similarly to the document itself. These two features lead to design 
a very compact index (its decryption and transmission overhead 
must not exceed its own benefit), embedded in the document in a 
way compatible with streaming. For these reasons, we concentrate 
on indexing the structure of the document, pushing aside the 
indexation of its content. The objective of the index is to detect 
rules and queries that cannot apply inside a given subtree, with 
the expected benefit to skip this subtree if it turns out to be 
forbidden or irrelevant wrt the query. Keeping the compactness 
requirement in mind, the minimal information required to achieve 
this goal is the set of element tags that appear in each subtree (to 
check whether an access rule automaton is likely to reach its final 
state) as well as the subtree size (to make the skip actually 
possible). Although this metadata does not capture the tag nesting, 
it reveals oneself as a very effective way to filter out irrelevant 
access control rules. For ensuring compactness, we compress the 
document structure using a dictionary of tags [9] and encode the 
set of tags thanks to a bit array referring to the tag dictionary. To 
further reduce the indexing overhead, we apply recursive 
compression on both the set of tags bit array and the subtree size. 
More details can be found in [2]. 
3. THE DEMONSTRATOR 
The demonstration platform includes the whole prototype 
architecture as well as two applications. The architecture, 
depicted in Figure 3, is composed of:  
• a terminal connected to the smart card. It contains a proxy 
allowing the applications to communicate easily with the 
different elements of the architecture through an XML API 
independent of the underlying protocols (JDBC, APDU1). 
• a DSP which hosts encrypted XML documents shared by users 
as well as encrypted access rules. Both are encrypted using 
secret keys exchanged between users thanks to a public key 
infrastructure (PKI)2.  
• a smart card in charge of enforcing access control. For the 
demonstration, we use e-gate smart cards developed by Axalto,  
                                                                
1 Application Protocol Data Unit: Communication protocol between the 
terminal and the smart card 
2 In the demonstration, we will not use a PKI infrastructure but rather 
simulate it to keep the demonstration independent of a network 
connection. Moreover, PKI is a well-known technique that need not be 
demonstrated. 
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Figure 3. Architecture 
a subsidiary of Schlumberger. These smart cards provide a 
powerful CPU and strong security features but still have a 
limited memory (only 1 KB of RAM available for on-board 
applications) and a low bandwidth (2KB/s). 
The advantage provided by this architecture is twofold. First, the 
complexity of the access control, query and security management 
is confined in the smart card and its proxy, so that the application 
developer can concentrate on the application logic. Second, the 
proposed architecture complies with the standards. Documents are 
described in XML and both access control rules and queries are 
expressed in XPath, two very popular W3C standards.  
To assess the generality of the approach, the features of our 
prototype will be demonstrated through two applications. The first 
application deals with collaborative works among a community of 
users while the second one deals with the selective dissemination 
of multimedia streams through unsecured channels. They are 
representative of two rather different profiles regarding the way 
the information is accessed (pull vs. push), the type of this 
information (textual vs. video) and the response time 
requirements (user patience / real time).  
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